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abstract
As recent experience all too clearly demonstrates, liquid markets do not exist for 
all financial assets at all times. In some respects, this can be thought of as a market 
failure. This paper addresses how best to promote asset market liquidity given 
this market failure, and the appropriate balance between the private and public 
sectors in establishing arrangements for dealing with liquidity problems. There 
are three main conclusions. First, improvements in the financial infrastructure 
– including arrangements for disclosure and post-trade processing – have a role 
to play in limiting the sharp rise in information asymmetries that can occur when 
conditions in financial markets are strained and at turning points in the financial 
cycle. Second, recent events have shown up shortcomings in the way that financial 
institutions manage their own liquidity, and these shortcomings need addressing. 
Third, it may be welfare-improving for the public sector to provide liquidity 
services when liquidity is strained. The central bank can smooth liquidity over the 
cycle, and the public sector can facilitate the change of ownership of assets from 
a troubled institution, which in extremis may include the public sector buying 
assets outright. If the public sector does actively provide liquidity services, then 
arrangements need to be put in place to ensure that the potential welfare gains 
from doing so are not undermined by financial institutions taking on greater risk 
than is warranted.
JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G28 
Keywords: asset market liquidity, central bank market operations, lender of 
last resortii
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1.  introd�ction introd�ction
As recent experience all too clearly demonstrates, liquid markets do not exist 
for all financial assets at all times. In some respects, this can be thought of as a 
market failure. The broad question that this paper examines is how public policy 
should best address this market failure, particularly in situations in which there 
is a potential threat to the stability of the financial system.
This question is of more than academic interest. The events of the past year have 
served as a stark reminder that a lack of liquidity in asset markets, particularly 
in times of increased uncertainty, can have significant implications for financial 
institutions, and the economy as a whole. In particular, the inability to sell assets 
and/or to raise funding can amplify disturbances in the financial system and 
contribute to significant losses in output. To the extent that these effects stem 
from a market failure, there is a public policy case for addressing that failure or, 
if that is not possible, at least addressing its consequences.
The discussion in this paper centres on two broad issues. The first is how best 
to promote asset market liquidity, and the second is the appropriate balance 
between the private and public sector in establishing arrangements for dealing 
with liquidity problems. A particular focus is to what extent the public sector 
should provide ‘systemic liquidity services’ to the private sector and, if it is to 
provide such services, how this should be done, and what conditions should 
apply to address moral hazard concerns and to ensure that new distortions are 
not introduced.
The paper is structured as follows. It begins by summarising the ‘first-best’ world 
of complete markets (and complete contracts) in which institutions are able to sell 
assets in liquid markets and generate liquidity when it is needed, and discusses 
how the real world differs from this benchmark. This is followed in Section 3 
by a discussion of the various reasons why liquidity problems emerge in the 
real world. The following three sections then discuss possible ways of dealing 
with liquidity problems. These include: (i) reducing information asymmetries 
and improving financial market infrastructure; (ii) restricting the amount of 
maturity transformation undertaken by the banking sector; and (iii) the public 
sector providing various liquidity services to the private sector. This is followed 
in Section 7 with a general discussion of the policy issues.
The paper’s main conclusions can be summarised as follows.2
First, improvements in the financial infrastructure – including arrangements for 
disclosure and post-trade processing – have a role to play in limiting the sharp 
rise in information asymmetries that can occur when conditions in financial 
markets are strained and at turning points in the financial cycle. In doing so, 
these improvements can reduce the probability of liquidity drying up during these 
episodes. It is important, however, to be realistic about what can be achieved in 
this area, as information asymmetries are pervasive in the financial system, and 
are likely to remain so.
Second, recent events have shown up shortcomings in the way that financial 
institutions manage their own liquidity, and these shortcomings need addressing. 
However, the social costs of financial institutions fully self insuring against 
liquidity problems arising from market dislocation and/or the inability to sell 
assets on reasonable terms, are likely to be quite high. The public sector may be 
able to play a useful role here by providing a range of liquidity services to the 
private sector that help ameliorate the adverse effects on welfare of a lack of 
asset-market liquidity.
Third, if the public sector is to provide these liquidity services, then arrangements 
need to be put in place to ensure that the potential welfare gains from doing so are 
not undermined by financial institutions taking on greater risk than is warranted. 
Given that widespread liquidity problems are most likely to emerge at turning 
points in economic and financial cycles, one possibility is to strengthen the 
macroprudential dimension of supervision, with increased capital, and possibly 
liquidity, buffers being built up in the good times. 
2.  the First-best and the real world
In thinking about how public policy should respond to asset illiquidity it is 
useful to step back and ask what the ‘first-best’ world would look like. This was 
done very nicely at this conference last year in a paper by Franklin Allen and 
Elena Carletti.
They note that ‘if financial markets are complete, it is possible for intermediaries 
to hedge all aggregate risks in financial markets’ (p 207). In such a world, 
institutions could use securities, derivatives or trading strategies to ensure that 
liquidity is available when it is needed, with the price system ensuring that the 
liquidity was appropriately priced in every state of the world. In this perfect 
world, ‘market liquidity’ would be plentiful so that assets could be readily bought 
and sold at their fundamental value, and ample ‘funding liquidity’ would enable 
solvent institutions to easily borrow against their assets. 
1  See Allen  and  Carletti  (2007),  and  also Allen  and  Gale  (2004)  and  Holmstrom  and 
Tirole (1988).3
The real world falls well short of this first-best benchmark in at least two important 
ways. The first is that not all assets can be bought and sold in liquid markets, and 
where liquid markets do exist in normal times, they can disappear at short notice, 
just when they are most needed. The second is that the availability of funding 
can evaporate quickly, making it difficult for institutions to continue financing 
their assets. The effect of this can be particularly pronounced if it coincides (as 
is likely) with illiquid asset markets, as the institution experiencing the funding 
difficulties cannot simply downsize its balance sheet by selling assets in an orderly 
market. The reasons why these liquidity problems can emerge are discussed in 
the following section.
Given the limitations of the real world, distressed fire sales of assets can occur, 
and solvent institutions can find themselves unable to obtain funding, or sell 
assets on reasonable terms. As Allen and Carletti note, the result can be more 
volatility in asset prices than is socially optimal, and ‘costly and inefficient crises’ 
(2007, p 209).
While the real world clearly falls short of the first-best, many of the developments 
in the financial system over recent years can be seen as moving the system closer 
to this benchmark. One obvious example is the securitisation of loans on banks’ 
balance sheets, with securitisation offering the promise that historically illiquid 
assets could be liquefied. Indeed, some financial institutions had included the 
possibility of securitisation in their contingency planning for a liquidity crisis. 
Another example is the widespread use of contingent credit lines, with the entity 
paying for such a line essentially insuring itself against the possibility of funding 
difficulties and/or being a forced seller of assets. There has also been very strong 
growth in the trading of a whole range of financial products, which has allowed 
various assets and risks that previously could not be traded in markets to now 
be traded; one example is the credit default swap (CDS) market which allows 
the trading of credit risk.
The paradox here, however, is that while these developments may have moved the 
system closer to the first-best world in normal times, they do not appear to have 
had the same effect under more turbulent conditions. Many of these developments 
assist with the management of idiosyncratic liquidity issues and aid the efficient 
functioning of the market under normal conditions. However, they have not 
proved particularly resilient under strain, and the comfort that they have provided 
to institutions under normal conditions may have increased aggregate liquidity 
risk by encouraging the belief that if things changed for the worse, the markets 
could be relied upon to manage both liquidity and asset positions.
As institutions have become more dependent upon financial markets for the 
management of their balance sheets, the importance of the smooth functioning 
of these markets has simultaneously increased. Not only are these markets used 4
for managing many more risks than was once the case, they have also supported 
the increased use of mark-to-market accounting. One consequence of these 
developments is that if liquidity dries up, amplifying movements in the prices 
of financial assets, the potential systemic implications are much larger than they 
once might have been.2
Reflecting this, in the past decade there have been a number of cases in which 
concerns about market liquidity have been at the forefront of policy-makers’ 
minds. The concerns have been most acute in situations in which the failure of 
an institution was considered a real possibility. In particular, in the cases of both 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and Bear Stearns, policy-makers in 
the United States were extremely concerned that markets could not deal with 
the closing-out of positions that would inevitably follow the failure of a major 
counterparty. As Bill McDonough, the then Head of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, said in the wake of LTCM’s problems, the closing out of these positions 
‘... would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, leading 
to a rush out of private credits, leading to a further widening of credit spreads, 
leading to further liquidations of positions, and so on’ (see McDonough 1998). 
Similarly, 10 years later, in explaining the Fed’s actions in response to Bear 
Stearns’ problems, the Head of the New York Fed, Tim Geithner, said that by 
agreeing to lend against a pool of assets, the Fed had ‘… reduced the risk that 
those assets would be liquidated quickly, exacerbating already fragile conditions 
in markets’ (Geithner 2008).
Similar concerns arose when the US hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors, got into 
trouble in 2006. In particular, its counterparties were concerned that if its positions 
had to be closed out on-market, there would be very large movements in prices 
with potentially destabilising effects. In that case, the situation was resolved by 
one of Amaranth’s bankers eventually taking over its positions off-market at a 
substantial discount to their apparent market value. One view on why the situation 
with Amaranth was more easily resolved than LTCM’s is that its positions were 
exchange-traded rather than being over-the-counter (OTC), an issue we discuss 
in the next section.
Liquidity issues have also been at the forefront of concerns arising from the 
sub-prime problem in the United States. A sharp fall in the demand for assets 
with unfavourable liquidity characteristics has seen a marked fall in the price of 
these assets relative to those whose liquidity is more assured, with many markets 
having essentially closed. Many financial institutions have also become much less 
willing to tie up their balance sheets in assets that cannot be sold easily, including 
term bank loans. This, combined with concerns about the ability to tap various 
2  Gai et al (2008) present a model which explains why financial innovation may have made 
financial crises less likely, but more severe if they occur.5
funding markets on an ongoing basis, has resulted in a substantial increase in 
term spreads and a significant tightening of credit conditions. In some countries, 
there have also been runs on financial institutions, something that in the past has 
been quite rare in developed financial systems.
These various liquidity problems have not just affected a small group of institutions, 
but have been global in nature, and have had significant effects on economic 
activity. Indeed, the swing from a situation in which liquidity was unusually high, 
to one in which it is unusually tight, has been the major driver of the current 
business cycle in many countries.
Given the potential for adverse impacts of liquidity problems on the financial 
system and the real economy, a relevant question is: how should policy-makers 
respond? This question has taken on additional importance over time, particularly 
given that many developments may have moved the financial system further 
away from the first-best in troubled times. The arrangements for dealing with 
system-wide liquidity problems and, more broadly, disruptions to markets have 
become particularly important.
Here there are at least three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) perspectives, 
which we have stylised to make the views as clear as possible.
The first is that further financial innovation is required, so that the real world 
looks more like the first-best, not just in normal times, but also in troubled times. 
According to this perspective, the main problem with current arrangements 
is that there are still too many missing markets and too many impediments to 
state-contingent contracts, and that key parts of the financial infrastructure are 
underdeveloped. The key to a more stable system is to develop these markets, 
remove these impediments, and shore up the existing markets by improving the 
financial infrastructure so that participants can transact on reasonable terms in 
both good and bad times.
A second perspective is that financial markets will never be complete, and that 
realistically the various forces that periodically cause liquidity problems can 
never be completely overcome. In response, financial institutions need to hold 
more liquid assets than they have become accustomed to, and to be more realistic 
about their true potential liquidity needs (reflecting both explicit and implicit 
commitments). In doing so they need to take into account the possibility that 
normally liquid asset markets and reliable funding sources can evaporate in times 
of stress. According to this perspective, liquidity insurance has been underpriced 
for too long and many financial institutions have undertaken too much maturity 
transformation. Reflecting this, institutions need to either voluntarily hold more 
liquidity, or be forced to do so by regulators. The case for addressing this issue 
through regulation is strengthened by the idea that the benefits to the system of 6
an institution holding more liquid assets are not fully internalised, with regulation 
potentially solving the distortion caused by this externality.
A third perspective is that while private financial institutions need to be responsible 
for ensuring that they can deal with idiosyncratic liquidity problems, they should 
not have to shoulder alone the burden of ensuring themselves against system-
wide disruptions. According to this view, overall social welfare can be improved 
by the public sector providing systemic liquidity services to the private sector. 
In some situations it may be able to do this at little cost and with little risk to 
the taxpayer. In other cases, the risks may be significant, but so too may be the 
benefits; in particular, by playing this role, the public sector may be able to reduce 
the costs that society pays for financial intermediation. 
We  return  to  these  various  perspectives  in  the  following  sections.  Before 
this, however, it is useful to discuss the reasons why asset markets are not 
always liquid.
3.  reasons for asset market illiq�idity
In assessing potential policy directions it is worth first considering the reasons why 
not all assets can be sold in liquid markets and why, on occasions, liquidity can 
disappear from previously liquid assets. Importantly, there can be close correlations 
between reductions in market liquidity and funding liquidity. If market-makers 
(broker-dealers) have more difficulty obtaining funding liquidity, they will be less 
able to fund short-term holdings and so smooth imbalances in demand/supply 
over time, thereby reducing market liquidity. Similarly, if market liquidity is low, 
then a broker-dealer will have more difficulty obtaining a collateralised loan, 
or that loan will have a high margin, because the lender is less certain that the 
market price of that asset can be realised. Consequently, funding liquidity will 
also be low. Reflecting these interconnections, the following discussion focuses 
on four explanations for a lack of liquidity in the markets for various financial 
assets. These are:
•  the existence of asymmetric information;
•  a sudden rise in uncertainty;
•  a lack of adequate market infrastructure; and
•  the  development  of  one-sided  markets  following  troubles  with  a  market 
participant.
3.1  asymmetric information
The first, and most obvious, reason for liquidity problems is the existence of 
asymmetric information between the potential buyers and sellers. If buyers are 
concerned that sellers know more about the quality of the asset than they do 7
– either because they are unwilling to reveal, or unable to credibly reveal, the 
relevant information – they will be reluctant to purchase the asset unless this 
asymmetry can be overcome. This has, for example, been one reason why bank 
loans, particularly to small and medium-sized businesses, have typically not been 
traded in deep and liquid markets. Similarly, a rapid change in investors’ concerns 
about the degree of information asymmetries can see liquidity in previously liquid 
markets dry up quickly.
As financial markets have matured, various ways of ameliorating the effects of 
asymmetric information have developed. One is for investors to rely on credit 
rating agencies, with many investors taking advantage of the economies of scale 
by delegating the monitoring of asset quality to these agencies. Another is for 
institutions to develop reputations for comprehensive and accurate disclosure.   
A third is for lenders to retain a financial interest in assets that they originate, that 
is, to keep some ‘skin in the game’. In securitisation markets this can be achieved 
by the lender, or a related entity, holding the first-loss tranche, or in syndicated 
lending by the lead lender holding a large portion of the loan. In addition, where 
possible, counterparty risk could be reduced by the novation of transactions to 
a central counterparty.
One of the main reasons that the recent strains in credit markets have been so 
pervasive is that investors’ confidence in some of these antidotes to information 
asymmetries has been severely shaken. This is particularly the case in relation 
to structured credit products, but also for bank balance sheets more generally.
An important element here is that the reputations of the credit rating agencies 
have been badly dented. Over recent years, many investors have taken comfort 
in the belief that these agencies were spending the necessary time and effort to 
understand and assess the risk associated with a wide range of assets. As a result, 
many felt, perhaps inappropriately, that they did not need to fully understand the 
details of the investment themselves. When the difficulties emerged, these same 
investors began questioning whether the rating agencies had really understood 
the assets that they were rating (or had applied appropriate ratings), and whether 
they had been too close to those selling the assets.
A second factor is the perception that many banks have been slow to ‘come 
clean’ about the structure of their portfolios and the extent of their losses. 
This perception was reinforced by some banks writing down the same assets 
numerous times within a relatively short period. Some investors interpreted this 
as banks holding back information, at least initially, particularly given the lack 
of transparency about the exact assets that were in the portfolio, and how those 
assets were being valued. Similarly, when some banks announced write-downs 
this led to the perception that competitor banks with assumed similar portfolios 8
that had made no announcement were hiding their losses. In turn, this generated 
increased concerns that banks knew something that outside investors did not. 
3.2  a S�dden rise in uncertainty
A second reason that liquidity issues can emerge, including the loss of liquidity in 
previously liquid markets, is that uncertainty about the future increases suddenly. 
Here the issue is not so much that buyers think that sellers might have more 
information than they do, but rather that there is a general increase in uncertainty 
about the future economic and financial environment by both buyers and sellers 
of assets.
A high level of uncertainty is itself, of course, not necessarily an inhibitor to a 
liquid market, with many assets with highly uncertain pay-offs trading in liquid 
markets. Instead, the issue is more that liquidity can disappear when the degree 
of uncertainty suddenly increases. During such episodes, investors can come to 
question both existing norms of behaviour and the usefulness of the historical 
record in valuing assets. The result can be a significant reduction in the willingness 
to transact. When there are asymmetric pay-offs, an increase in uncertainty can 
also amplify the agency problem that an investor or lender faces.
In a sense, a rapid increase in uncertainty can itself prevent the market-clearing 
process, with investors choosing to stand on the sidelines until they have reassessed 
the risk-return characteristics of many assets. In this environment, because of 
the information asymmetries discussed above, sellers of assets can be seen as 
particularly desperate, further undermining the ability to sell assets.
Structured  debt  markets  appear  particularly  prone  to  this  problem.  Credit 
derivatives also seem subject to evaporating liquidity; Fitch Ratings (2004), for 
example, found that for individual-name CDS, liquidity declined substantially 
when the relevant company encountered some form of stress. In contrast, in 
foreign exchange markets a change in the economic environment and a sharp 
increase in uncertainty can result in very large movements in prices, but liquidity 
is not normally absent for extended periods. One explanation for this is that in 
the foreign exchange market most of the factors that influence exchange rates 
are public knowledge, whereas in debt and credit derivative markets, periods of 
sharply increased uncertainty typically coincide with increased concerns about 
information asymmetries. Similarly, equity markets, as a whole, do not suffer 
from sharp reductions in liquidity as a result of increased uncertainty because 
the high levels of disclosure and considerable public analysis of stocks mean that 
uncertainty is less likely to result in higher perceived information asymmetries. 
However, even in equity markets, liquidity has recently declined more for stocks 
with small market capitalisation, for which there is typically less analysis and so 9
potentially greater information asymmetries, than for large market capitalisation 
stocks (Figure 1).
A generalised increase in uncertainty can also cause liquidity problems through 
banks becoming markedly less willing to make new loans. This can occur if the 
increase in uncertainty triggers a reassessment by banks of their ability to raise 
funds in the future and the extent to which existing clients will call on lines of 
credit. In this environment, banks may themselves seek to increase their own 
holdings of liquid assets, as protection against this more uncertain world. This 
has the potential to generate self-perpetuating liquidity problems, with banks 
becoming reluctant to lend and withdrawing from financial markets.
3.3  market infrastr�ct�re 
A  third  factor  influencing  liquidity  is  the  underlying  market  infrastructure. 
Market design – involving how buyers and sellers interact to reveal their private 
information and how they settle their trades – can have a significant influence 
on how the market responds when conditions become strained. It is notable that 
in the current turmoil, dislocation has tended to be greater in the markets for 
financial assets and derivatives that trade in OTC markets and settle bilaterally. 
Structured finance products and many derivatives typically trade OTC because 
of their inherent idiosyncratic features. Products trading in OTC markets can 
be tailored to the specific requirements of the counterparties and these markets 
Fig�re 1: Liq�idity in Large and Small a�stralian Listed Firms
Sources:  Bloomberg; RBA
























are often more suitable for new and developing products. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that structured financial products and many derivatives typically trade 
in OTC markets.
At the heart of the recent turmoil has been an increase in perceived counterparty 
risk, related to a large extent to asymmetric information as discussed above. Since 
most derivatives that trade in OTC markets settle bilaterally, confidence in one’s 
counterparty to meet all obligations is critical to the willingness to trade. This is 
particularly so for many long-lived derivatives – including credit derivatives – for 
which the relationship with a counterparty may last many years. Not surprisingly, 
heightened counterparty risk has led to a significant reduction in liquidity in many 
bilateral markets. Indeed, it is notable that liquidity in foreign exchange swap 
markets declined more at longer horizons where counterparty risk is greater.
Other aspects of OTC markets can also make them more susceptible to potential 
buyers or sellers remaining on the sidelines. Trading in competitive markets is 
often concentrated, either at a point in time or a particular location, because 
the more traders there are, the greater the odds that a buyer or seller can find a 
matching order and so trade at the market price. Because OTC markets can be 
more fragmented than exchange-traded markets, they may be more susceptible 
to a loss of liquidity – in essence there is an unwillingness to transact because it 
can be harder to locate buyers or sellers. 
Lack of transaction transparency can also reduce the willingness to trade. If 
market participants cannot observe recent transaction prices, then, in a period 
of increased uncertainty or volatility, they may be less willing to trade for fear 
of trading away from the true market price. In general, OTC markets have lower 
transaction transparency than exchange markets. 
One example of a market in which low transaction transparency appears to have 
hampered liquidity is the market for Australian residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS). Unlike the case in the United States, Australian RMBS 
have not suffered a deterioration of fundamentals, with arrears and default rates 
remaining low. Yet in early 2008, large selling by offshore structured investment 
vehicles contributed to a substantial fall in the prices of Australian RMBS. In 
the following months, liquidity in the market was low as buyers continued to 
bid at the low prices at which ‘distressed’ sales had reportedly taken place, while 
sellers asked for higher prices on the basis that the distressed selling had abated. 
One factor contributing to wide bid/ask spreads was a lack of timely information 
about actual transaction prices. 11
3.4  the need to Close o�t Large Positions in a Short Period 
(Partic�larly after a Fail�re)
A fourth factor that can lead to liquidity problems is the failure, or near failure, 
of a large institution or investor. The news, and rumour, surrounding such an 
event can result in a sharp increase in uncertainty and perceived information 
asymmetries, thereby decreasing liquidity through the channels described above. 
Ordinarily, large investors build up or sell positions gradually so as to reduce 
the price impact that can result from large changes in their positions. However, 
in a time of stress, a large investor may not have the luxury of selling gradually 
in order to minimise the price impact. While an asset’s price falling below its 
fundamental value might ordinarily provide opportunities for other traders, large 
price falls in one market can have significant ongoing adverse consequences for 
that market and related markets. 
The feedback mechanisms largely result from the use of debt to fund positions in 
those markets. The fall in asset values means that investors are less able to obtain 
funding, because in effect their gearing has increased. The resulting margin calls 
require further asset sales to repay debt, causing further price falls. Brunnermeier 
(forthcoming) has termed this mechanism a ‘loss spiral’, with Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (forthcoming) presenting an additional ‘margin spiral’ channel 
that compounds the loss spiral. They argue that lending standards tighten when 
prices fall, so that margins increase. This reduction in funding liquidity results 
in additional asset sales and further price falls. Furthermore, the price fall in one 
market can spill over to other markets. If price falls lead to a general tightening of 
lending standards then the ‘margin spiral’ will spread to other markets. Similarly, 
investors may sell other assets to meet margin calls or redemptions because 
liquidity in the market with the initial price falls has declined and so the ‘loss 
spiral’ will spread.
Given the prevalence of borrowing to fund positions and use of margins to 
provide security for these loans it is difficult to avoid loss spirals and margin 
spirals, particularly in the case of the failure of a large investor. Hence it is 
important to attempt to minimise their impact by providing a market framework 
that reduces information asymmetries and uncertainty, thereby lessening any 
decline in liquidity. 
3.5  S�mmarising reasons for illiq�idity
The existence of asymmetric information and increases in uncertainty are central 
to explaining illiquidity in asset markets. As described in the paper so far, these 
factors alone are sufficient to hamper the development of liquid markets, or cause 
liquid markets to become illiquid. But their interaction with inadequate market 
infrastructure or one-sided markets following the failure of a large participant 12
can result in severe illiquidity across many asset markets. In the following 
sections we consider measures that have been used, or could be used, to make 
liquidity in financial markets more resilient to these problems. One possibility is 
the promotion of financial infrastructure that reduces information asymmetries. 
But, acknowledging that these initiatives may not always be successful or be 
possible, we then consider how to mitigate the impact of shocks that would 
reduce liquidity, either through financial institutions holding more liquid assets 
or the public sector providing liquidity services. 
4.  Promoting Financial infrastr�ct�re that red�ces 
information asymmetries
Given the central role that information asymmetries play in market illiquidity, an 
obvious way in which to address liquidity issues is to reduce these asymmetries, 
particularly at turning points in the economic cycle.
Here, there are a number of possibilities, including: further improving disclosure by 
financial institutions; improving the credit rating process; and improving settlement 
procedures, including facilitating the increased use of central counterparties. 
4.1  disclos�re
While the amount of information disclosed by banks has increased over recent 
years, the level of disclosure remains, in many cases, well short of what is required. 
Looking at recent announcements of write-downs by international banks, it is 
very difficult, even for sophisticated investors, to make an assessment of whether 
the new asset valuations are realistic. The disclosure statements typically contain 
only rather general statements of valuation policies, and little specific information 
about particular assets or portfolios of assets.
In part, the limited disclosure reflects the fundamental difficulty of valuing some 
assets. But it also reflects the reluctance by financial institutions to provide 
information about the specifics of their portfolios for fear of revealing trading 
strategies or portfolio positions to their competitors and counterparties. 
4.2  Credit ratings
A second possibility is to improve the credit rating process – particularly as it 
relates to structured credit products – in order to rebuild confidence in the rating 
process, and ensure that ratings convey more complete information to investors. 
There are many positive aspects to ratings arrangements, including avoiding the 
inefficiency that can arise if each investor is required to undertake his/her own 
analysis. But there is little doubt that ratings arrangements can be improved. One 
concern that has been highlighted by recent events is that the rating agencies are 13
paid by the issuers, rather than the investors for whom they provide information. 
Particularly for structured finance products, which can be designed to adhere to 
the rating agency’s ratings criteria, the close relationship between issuers and 
rating agencies may distort incentives and additionally lead to structures that only 
just qualify for a given rating. One possible solution would be for users, rather 
than issuers, to pay for ratings, but the coordination or free-rider problem among 
investors would make such a change very difficult to achieve. A more practical 
modification would be to limit the degree to which rating agencies can be paid to 
consult on the structure of a product to be rated, acknowledging that sellers could 
still use their experience to attempt to structure according to ratings criteria.3
An issue that is at the heart of this debate is the extent to which ratings convey 
useful information to investors (and how investors use that information). While 
there is, understandably, a strong demand for simplicity, in many cases summarising 
all the relevant risk information in a single rating is too simplistic. Mechanisms 
need to be found to present investors with more complete information, without 
undermining  the  very  useful  role  rating  agencies  can  play  in  overcoming 
information asymmetries. This additional information could include the robustness 
of models typically used to rate structured finance products, and the sensitivity 
to external parameters, including changes in the economic environment. 
One way in which ratings might become less simplistic is through the introduction 
of different ratings scales for different asset classes, such as structured finance 
products or corporate bonds. More useful still might be multi-dimensional ratings. 
For example, ratings could consist of both a letter rating (AAA, AA, etc) and an 
indicator that makes the distinction between the probability of default and the 
expected loss given default, or an indicator that summarises the transition probability 
matrix, thereby providing information about the likelihood of the asset suffering 
multiple notch downgrades. There have been several suggestions along these lines 
over the past year (see, for example, CGFS 2008b; IOSCO 2008; SEC 2008) 
and comments by the rating agencies (Fitch Ratings 2008; Moody’s 2008). For 
structured finance products, these aspects of risk are much more critical than for 
standard corporate or government bonds which have generally been served well 
by a simple letter rating scale. 
4.3  market design market design
A third possibility is for the trading in some derivatives and securitised assets 
to move from OTC markets to exchanges (see, for example, Cecchetti 2007; 
Alexander 2008). As discussed above, the nature of OTC markets may accentuate 
the problems of asymmetric information, especially at turning points, leading 
3  See IOSCO (2008) for a proposal along these lines.14
to sharp reductions in liquidity when conditions unexpectedly change. Several 
features of exchange-traded markets reduce or eliminate risks that exist in OTC 
markets, making them potentially more robust. One of these is that settlement 
typically occurs through a central counterparty. This means that instead of buyers 
and sellers having counterparty risk with other market participants, the risk is to 
a highly rated, and in many cases regulated, entity. As a result, concerns about 
counterparty risk which have contributed to reduced liquidity in many markets 
in the past year are largely obviated. Having assets traded on an exchange also 
increases price transparency, so that even in periods of increased uncertainty, 
market participants are more likely to know where the market price is and so this 
source of information asymmetry is avoided. The observability of the price can 
also reduce uncertainty elsewhere because marking assets to market is simpler, 
which,  for  example,  would  reduce  information  asymmetry  about  financial 
institutions’ balance sheets. 
There are other benefits of exchange-traded markets over OTC markets in that 
there are lower settlement and legal risks, lower transaction costs, and potentially 
greater liquidity through participation by a wider range of investors. 
Often new financial products start out with diffuse characteristics, but over time 
evolve into having more standard features, making them more suited to being 
exchange-traded.  This  migration  can,  however,  be  quite  difficult,  requiring 
overcoming legal and market frictions, and the incentive that some institutions 
may have to retain OTC trading, where profit margins might be higher. Given 
these difficulties, there may be a case for regulatory policies to play a role in 
encouraging exchange-traded markets. 
One relatively new product, which in many cases has become fairly standardised 
and thus suited to being exchange-traded, is the CDS. However, to date, attempts 
by several exchanges to list credit default derivatives have been unsuccessful.4 
One guide for how credit derivatives could evolve is the development of interest 
rate derivatives, which have a longer history. As Figure 2 shows, OTC markets in 
these derivatives grew much more rapidly through the 1990s than the exchange-
traded markets. This partly reflected the fact that interest rate derivatives were still 
evolving reasonably quickly and there was considerable innovation. In contrast, 
in more recent times – as the products have become more standardised – the two 
market types have seen similar growth rates.5
4  Attempts by several exchanges in the United States (CME, CBOT and CBOE) and Europe 
(Eurex) to list credit derivatives have been unsuccessful because of a lack of support from 
market participants.
5  The levels of outstanding derivatives in OTC and exchange-traded markets cannot be directly 
compared as exchanges have netting whereas the outstanding value in OTC markets is a 
gross figure.15
A transition from OTC to exchange-traded markets is obviously not universally 
possible, nor desirable, given the customised features of many financial assets. 
For these assets, improvements in clearing and settlement procedures can bring 
some of the benefits that come from exchange-based trading. In particular, it is 
important that the post-trade arrangements encourage the matching and clearing 
of trades on the trade date, or as soon as is practicably possible. The establishment 
of the Depository Trust Clearing Corporation’s (DTCC’s) Trade Information 
Warehouse in the United States has been a useful step forward in this regard, 
particularly for credit derivatives. Moreover, the use of central counterparties 
need not be restricted to exchange-traded markets. Indeed, there is a strong case 
for the use of such arrangements for a variety of OTC markets. On this front there 
have been some positive developments in recent months. DTCC and the Clearing 
Corporation (CCorp) have agreed to provide central counterparty services for 
some OTC credit derivatives, using DTCC’s Trade Information Warehouse and 
the central counterparty services of CCorp.6 There is a good chance that a central 
counterparty will become a feature for some OTC credit derivatives; at a recent 
meeting hosted by the New York Fed, industry participants and regulators agreed 
6  Initially CCorp will act as a central counterparty for US index trades, but it has plans to 
expand to cover other CDS products. The announcement is available at <http://www.
clearingcorp.com/press/pressreleases/20080528-dtcc-cds.html>. See also Alexander (2008). 
For earlier discussion, see Ledrut and Upper (2007).
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to support a central counterparty for CDS (see FRBNY 2008). However, there are 
notable challenges to overcome in developing a functional central counterparty, 
not the least of which is determining how to value bespoke credit derivatives in 
order to set margins.
One means of facilitating more products to trade on exchanges, and also directly 
reducing information asymmetries, is to increase the standardisation of the 
structure of various financial assets. Increased standardisation can concentrate 
liquidity, making the market more robust to shocks that would otherwise tend 
to cause liquidity to dry up. For RMBS, one possibility is for an exchange or 
another entity to set and monitor ‘qualifying’ standards, with RMBS that meet 
these standards being traded on an exchange. It is also possible to imagine 
continuous disclosure requirements being placed on the entity managing the 
underlying assets.7 In a sense, such arrangements would make the processes and 
infrastructure for trading of a variety of structured debt products more like those 
currently widely used for equities.
4.4  the way Forward the way Forward
There is little doubt that further steps along the lines discussed above could, and 
should, be taken to reduce existing information asymmetries and to improve 
market infrastructure. The main challenge is to develop arrangements that work 
not just in good times, but in bad times as well. Particular attention needs to be 
paid to ensuring that the integrity of information and the smooth functioning 
of infrastructure are not impaired when credit conditions or market sentiment 
deteriorates. Simply developing arrangements that add to the amount of information 
in good times, but that do not hold up in turbulent conditions may actually increase 
the probability of systemic liquidity problems.
It is, however, important to be realistic about what can be achieved in this 
dimension. The recent market strains are the end result of a long boom in the 
financial sector, underpinned by generally favourable economic conditions. During 
that boom – as has been the case in almost all preceding booms – investors and 
institutions simply did not pay enough attention to counterparty risks and the 
information that was available, applying an overly optimistic lens when looking to 
the future. This inherent excess optimism during the boom, followed by a period 
of pessimism when the risk built up during the boom materialises, is endemic and 
drives the procyclicality of the financial system. It means that simply providing 
7  While not advocating a move to exchange trading, the American Securitization Forum has 
recently proposed standardising disclosure for RMBS to facilitate comparison of different 
securities and publishing monthly information on the performance of RMBS loan pools. 
See ASF (2008).17
more information and improving market infrastructures is unlikely to be enough 
to address the liquidity problems that can emerge at the end of a long boom.
One consequence of this is that financial institutions and policy-makers need 
to consider other ways of reducing the probability of such problems emerging 
and dealing with them when they do emerge. These issues are addressed in the 
following sections.
5.  an increase in holdings of Liq�idassets an increase in holdings of Liq�id assets
In the various assessments of the recent credit market turmoil, a frequent conclusion 
has been that financial institutions and supervisors did not pay enough attention 
to liquidity risk. FSF (2008), for example, lists a number of shortcomings in 
liquidity management. These include banks: not adequately planning for system-
wide stress; not adequately considering the links between market liquidity, 
funding and credit risk; and not anticipating the need to honour committed lines 
of credit or the need to provide financing to clients in order to protect their own 
franchise value.
Essentially, these reviews are arguing that banks have held too few liquid assets, 
or assets of unpredictable liquidity, and have under-priced the provision of 
liquidity services to their customers. It is difficult to argue with this conclusion, 
as it now seems clear that, over recent years, proper liquidity management 
slipped off the radar screen for many financial institutions. A number of recent 
reports have pointed to the way forward here, including the more extensive use 
of stress tests, the development of robust contingency funding plans, and the 
need to allocate appropriate liquidity to all business lines (see, for example, 
BCBS 2008; IIF 2008; IMF 2008). Financial regulators are likely to have a role 
to play in achieving progress on a number of these fronts, as private institutions 
are unlikely to fully internalise the benefit to the system as a whole of maintaining 
high levels of liquidity.
This points to important questions that do not seem to have attracted the attention 
that they deserve: that is, to what extent financial institutions should be required 
to fully ‘self-insure’ against system-wide liquidity problems, and to what extent 
the public sector should assist when such problems emerge. In raising these 
questions, we want to make it clear that, in most cases, institutions should be 
able to deal with idiosyncratic liquidity problems, without any assistance from 
the public sector. Furthermore, institutions need to be able to deal with significant 
disruptions to asset markets and to their funding sources. But full self-insurance 
against generalised and widespread disruptions could come at a significant cost 
to both financial institutions and the economy more broadly. As a very rough 
illustration, suppose that such insurance required institutions to hold an extra 
10 per cent of their balance sheets in highly liquid, high-quality assets, and that the 18
expected return on these assets was 1 percentage point lower than the alternative. 
This type of portfolio shift would reduce the banking system’s return on assets by 
0.1 of a percentage point, and the return on equity by around 2 percentage points. 
Institutions might then be expected to increase their lending margins, which in 
turn might lead to a lower stock of capital in the economy and less output than 
might otherwise be the case.8 In addition, if financial institutions had to fully 
self-insure they might not be prepared to provide as much long-term funding as 
is currently the case. The issue is whether some insurance by the public sector 
is a better way to deal with these problems than financial institutions having to 
deal with them alone.
The extent to which financial institutions insure against system-wide liquidity 
problems is a current issue in Australia, as it is in many other countries. Over 
recent decades, the Australian banking system’s holdings of ‘liquid’ assets have 
fallen significantly as a share of their aggregate balance sheet. In the 1960s, around 
30 per cent of the banks’ total assets were held in government securities, and a 
further 8 per cent were held on deposit at the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
(although the vast bulk of these assets were held to meet regulatory requirements 
and so were not available for short-term liquidity purposes). Today, government 
securities account for just 0.5 per cent of total assets, and deposits at the RBA 
account for a further 0.2 per cent. This decline reflects both regulatory changes 
and a reduction in the supply of government securities on issue.9
A related feature of the Australian environment is that around 90 per cent of the 
Australian banking system’s liquid assets are ‘inside assets’, by which we mean 
the liabilities of other financial institutions (Figure 3). As at May 2008, these 
assets accounted for around 15 per cent of the system’s domestic assets, which 
is up from 12 per cent a year earlier. When the strains first developed in financial 
markets in August/September last year, the banks’ demand for liquidity increased 
significantly and, in response, they issued securities to one another, allowing 
each to record an increase in their liquid assets. Of course, at the same time, the 
banks’ short-term liabilities also increased. This heavy reliance on inside assets 
is unusual by international standards. In the United States, for example, banks’ 
holdings of such assets account for around 6 per cent of their total assets, with 
securities issued by the US government and federal agencies accounting for a 
higher 14 per cent.
This reliance on inside assets poses some challenges for dealing with system-
wide  liquidity  problems,  particularly  if  those  problems  are  associated  with 
8  Of course, if the cost of funding was reduced for an institution that held more liquid assets, 
the effect would be less than outlined here.
9  See Grenville (1991) for a discussion of these changes.19
system-wide credit quality concerns (which has not been the case recently). There 
are, however, simply not enough ‘outside assets’ in Australia for banks to hold 
the bulk of their liquid assets in securities issued by entities other than banks. 
Currently, the total stock of outstanding Commonwealth Government bonds 
is around $55 billion, with another $70 billion of state government bonds, and 
$45 billion of supra-national debt. This is in comparison to the total liquid assets 
of the banking system of around $350 billion.
Reflecting these developments, the RBA has, over the past decade, broadened 
the range of assets it will accept in repurchase agreements (‘repos’) to include 
securities issued by financial institutions. This has substantially increased the 
stock of securities that the RBA will accept under repo in its market operations. 
In comparison to a situation in which banks hold their liquid assets in outside 
assets, this potentially exposes the RBA to more risk; however, this increase in 
risk is limited by the fact that in the normal course of operations, banks are not 
able to sell their own or related securities to the RBA under repo.
In  the  following  section  we  discuss  in  further  detail  the  various  ways  in 
which the public sector can help deal with system-wide liquidity problems, 
including by providing some form of liquidity insurance or other services to the 
private sector. 
Fig�re 3: Banks’ Liq�id assets 
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6.  the Provision of Systemic Liq�idity Services by the P�blic 
Sector
To some extent, liquidity can be considered a public good. As discussed above, 
it is possible that social welfare is improved if financial institutions do not have 
to fully self-insure against system-wide liquidity problems. Indeed, in some 
situations it may be almost impossible for them to do so, particularly if there is 
only a limited supply of outside liquid assets.
If the public sector is going to play a role in providing ‘systemic liquidity services’ 
to the private sector, there are a number of channels through which this can be 
done, including:
•  the central bank’s open market operations;
•  the outright purchase of assets where liquidity is a problem;
•  the provision of liquidity assistance to an institution experiencing funding 
difficulties; and
•  assisting with off-market transfers of assets.
Each of these is discussed in turn below. The following section then discusses 
some of the conditions that might apply to the provision of these services.
6.1  open market operations arket operations
A basic function of a central bank is to manage the supply of settlement balances 
or reserves to ensure that the relevant interest rate (typically, an overnight money 
market rate) is close to the target level set for the purposes of monetary policy. 
The way in which this is done can have significant implications for how financial 
institutions manage their own liquidity, and for the liquidity characteristics of 
various assets. Through its open market operations, the central bank can create 
assets with unquestionable liquidity for the financial sector to hold, and by deeming 
assets as eligible for market operations, it can reduce illiquidity premia that apply 
to those assets. Market operations can also affect the maturity structure of banks’ 
liabilities and can be used, under some circumstances, as a channel to provide 
funding to institutions suffering temporary liquidity difficulties.
It  has  become  commonplace  for  central  banks  to  conduct  these  operations 
primarily in repos. Doing so makes it possible to undertake operations in a wide 
range of assets without taking on a high level of risk, since for a loss to occur, the 
central bank’s counterparty would need to fail, and the value of the underlying 
asset would need to fall significantly. Many central banks, however, also still use 
outright transactions to inject or withdraw cash from the system, although these 
operations are largely restricted to assets of the highest credit quality that trade 
in very liquid markets, typically government securities.21
6.1.1  Accommodating an increase in the demand for liquid assets
As we have seen recently, during a period of strain in financial markets, the 
demand for assets of unquestionable liquidity increases significantly. The central 
bank is ideally placed to respond to this increase, as it is in the unique position 
of being able to create such assets easily. It can do this by buying other assets 
from the private sector and, in exchange, providing institutions with the most 
liquid asset of all – a deposit at the central bank. If this is done through a repo, 
the incremental risk to the central bank need only be small.
In effect, such operations – which involve an expansion of the central bank’s 
balance sheet – allow private institutions to improve the liquidity characteristics 
of their own portfolios; while the assets that are sold to the central bank may 
themselves normally be traded in liquid markets, there is always the possibility 
that some disruption to these markets will reduce their liquidity in times of stress. 
This possibility does not exist with central bank balances. 
This type of expansion in the central bank’s balance sheet is more likely if the 
central bank pays a close-to-market interest rate on deposits. If interest is not 
paid, there can be a high opportunity cost for financial institutions of holding 
large balances, so that if the supply of these balances increases significantly, 
the overnight interest rate is likely to fall below the central bank’s target as 
institutions seek to lend these balances. An expansion is also more likely to 
occur in countries where the supply of ‘outside’ liquid assets is limited, since 
if system-wide credit quality concerns emerge, the demand for ‘inside’ assets 
is likely to decline significantly, with central banks’ balances being the main 
alternative very liquid investment. 
The central bank can also accommodate an increase in demand for liquid assets 
by altering the structure of its own balance sheet (without changing its size). In 
particular, it can reduce its own holdings of assets that are highly liquid (primarily 
government securities) and, in exchange, increase its holdings of assets that are 
less liquid.
Arguably, during periods in which liquid assets are very highly valued (forcing 
down the relative yields on these assets), it makes little sense for the central bank 
to hold the most liquid assets in the financial system. Provided the risk issues 
can be addressed, the central bank can play a type of smoothing role, by being 
prepared to reduce its own holdings of the most liquid assets at the very time 
that the private sector most values these assets. It is important to stress that, in 
playing this role, the central bank is in no sense bailing out banks, or funding 
the balance sheet expansion of the banking system. It is simply reducing its own 
call on the assets with the most favourable liquidity characteristics at a time 
when the private sector most values liquidity. In doing so, it can help reduce 22
the amplitude of swings in the price of liquidity, and it can do so without taking 
significant risks.
Over the past year or so, many central banks have responded in this way, expanding 
their balance sheets and/or changing the composition of their assets.10 The exact 
details have, to a significant extent, depended on institution-specific factors, 
including the composition and size of the central bank’s balance sheet, the assets 
accepted in open market operations, and whether interest is paid on balances 
at the central bank. For example, reserve balances at the Bank of England rose 
from an average of around £20 billion in the first half of 2007, to an average of 
around £26 billion over the past six months (Figure 4). Similarly, in Australia, 
the banking system’s balances at the RBA have also risen, from a daily average 
of around A$0.8 billion in the first half of 2007, to a peak of almost A$7 billion 
in December 2007 (Figure 5).11 Early on in the current episode the RBA also 
reduced its limited holdings of Commonwealth Government securities held on 
an outright basis, as well as both its government securities held under repo and 
its US dollar assets held under swap arrangements (Figure 6). At the same time, 
10 See Borio and Nelson (2008) and CGFS (2008a) for a discussion of recent changes in central 
bank operations, Debelle (2008) for more detail on Australia, and Hilton (2008) for more 
detail on the United States.
11 In both the United Kingdom and Australia, interest is paid on balances at the central bank. 
In the United Kingdom, it is paid at the policy rate for reserves within the threshold around 
the reserves target. In Australia, the interest rate paid is 25 basis points below the target 
cash rate.
Fig�re 4: reserve Balances at the Bank of England































Fig�re 6: rBa repo assets
Source:  RBA
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the RBA increased its holdings of bank-issued paper held under repo. In the 
United States, there has also been a significant change in the structure of the Fed’s 
balance sheet, with a large decline in the Fed’s holdings of government securities 
held outright and an increase in the value of agency-backed mortgage-backed 
securities held under repo (Figure 7). With the introduction late last year of the 
term auction facility (TAF), there has also been a very large increase in the Fed’s 
holdings of the wide range of relatively illiquid assets that banks pledge for use at 
the discount window. The Fed and the Bank of England also introduced facilities 
allowing banks to swap assets that were not particularly liquid for highly liquid 
government securities (the term securities lending facility, TSLF, for the Fed).
6.1.2  The choice of assets eligible for a repurchase agreement
A related issue that has attracted considerable attention is the range of assets that 
the central bank is prepared to purchase under repo. 
As recent experience illustrates, during a period in which conditions are strained, 
financial institutions have a strong preference to hold assets that can be used in 
operations with the central bank. This partly reflects a concern that other assets 
Fig�re 7: Federal reserve assets






























may not be easily sold in the private market if the institution needs funds at short 
notice. By making an asset eligible for repos, the central bank can reduce the 
(illiquidity) premium that might otherwise be needed to induce investors to hold 
that asset. Increasing the range of eligible assets is also likely to give institutions 
greater confidence that should liquidity pressures emerge, they have appropriate 
assets to undertake operations with the central bank.
Historically, in many countries, including Australia, the list of eligible assets 
has been relatively narrow. The logic for this was that the central bank simply 
did not need to accept a wide range of assets to conduct its markets operations 
effectively, and/or that accepting assets other than of the highest credit quality 
exposed the central bank to an unacceptable degree of risk.
One alternative to this historical view is that, in principle, all assets on the balance 
sheets of financial institutions should be eligible, subject to the risks to the central 
bank being adequately addressed. By accepting all assets, illiquidity premia 
that exist because of a lack of market infrastructure or market turmoil would be 
reduced, and the banking system would be less susceptible to liquidity crises, 
with both effects potentially increasing welfare. According to this perspective, 
the risk issue is best addressed, not by the central bank refusing to deal in some 
asset classes, but by setting appropriate haircuts, advancing fewer funds against 
more risky assets. 
Some central banks have gone a considerable way towards adopting this approach. 
Since the onset of the turmoil the central banks that had a relatively narrow range 
of eligible assets for their regular operations, including the Fed, have tended 
to widen the range, joining the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan 
which already had very broad ranges of eligible collateral. At a practical level, 
one concern with accepting any assets under repo is that it can be very difficult to 
value illiquid assets, and to determine the true nature of the risks, especially where 
information asymmetries are acute. This can make setting appropriate haircuts 
very difficult. One possible response to this uncertainty would be to apply ultra-
conservative haircuts to hard-to-evaluate assets, although this may undermine 
any benefit that might otherwise be gained from making these assets eligible for 
repos. Furthermore, within a class of illiquid and difficult-to-value assets with 
idiosyncratic properties – typically non-traded assets such as loans – there is the 
potential for a ‘lemons’ problem if a common haircut is applied. Within such an 
asset class, it would be possible that the central bank would only be presented 
with inferior assets for which a sizeable haircut was effectively less punitive.
A related issue is whether assets that have been either originated or sponsored 
by an institution (say its housing loans) should be accepted under repo from that 
institution. The main concern here is that taking such assets as part of normal 26
market operations can increase the risk to the central bank, as the ‘double 
protection’ that arises from conducting repos in third-party, or non-related, assets 
is significantly reduced. Doing so may also lead to financial institutions reducing 
their holdings of other liquid assets, while accepting assets from the institution 
that originated them may crowd out secondary markets because it reduces the 
incentive for originators to stimulate markets for those assets.
Again, an in-principle case could be made to take such ‘related’ assets, subject 
to appropriately calibrated haircuts. Doing so would seem less problematic if the 
lemons problem could be reduced, say through some combination of credit quality 
conditions on the loans or the loans being securitised and rated. This approach 
can be used to overcome, to a significant extent, the information asymmetries 
that might otherwise arise from taking mortgages directly from an institution, 
particularly where the central bank does not have the expertise, or in a crisis, 
time, to evaluate the quality of those mortgages. The RBA has adopted a variant 
of this approach for banks to have access to additional securities that they can 
use to obtain liquidity from the RBA in a period of turmoil. Here the RBA will 
accept only the AAA tranche of a securitisation of an institution’s own prime 
mortgages. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority has indicated that these 
so-called ‘self-securitisations’, of which banks have constructed $53 billion in 
the past six months, should not be substitutes for financial institutions’ holdings 
of more conventional liquid assets. 
6.1.3  The maturity of repos
Another aspect of market operations that has drawn attention is the maturity of 
these operations. 
If, at one extreme, the central bank undertakes all its operations in overnight 
repos, the banking system is required to sell securities to the central bank each 
and every day, buying them back the next. In this world, an institution that sold 
securities would get cash only overnight, and would then need to bid again in 
the open market operations with other institutions the following day. In the event 
that this institution was unsuccessful on the second day, it might need to arrange 
a repo (or another transaction) with a private counterparty to obtain the funding 
it was seeking. If market conditions are unsettled, this may be difficult or costly. 
To the extent that institutions are concerned about this possibility, they are likely 
to be less willing than otherwise to provide term funding to their clients.
In contrast, if the central bank conducts longer-term repos, say for a maturity of 
six months, repo turnover is reduced, but institutions that sell securities to the 
central bank obtain cash for a longer period, thus reducing their rollover risk. At 
the margin, this may promote term funding. Similarly, conducting longer-term 27
repos may encourage institutions to purchase longer-term securities in order to 
repo to the central bank, reducing term premiums. Also, as discussed above, to 
the extent that repos are used by institutions to substitute less-liquid assets for 
more-liquid assets, the benefit of doing so is likely to be greater if the substitution 
is in place for a longer time.
Not surprisingly, given the benefits of undertaking longer-term repos at times 
when illiquidity premiums are high, most central banks have responded by 
increasing the maturity of their operations. In Australia, the RBA has long had 
a flexible approach, and has avoided having fixed maturities. Recently, it has 
used this flexibility to extend the average maturity of its outstanding repos from 
around 20 days over the first half of 2007, to around 75 days in May this year 
(Figure 8).12 The average maturity of repos in other countries tends to be shorter 
than that in Australia, although in almost all cases it has increased over recent 
times (Figure 9).
12 The longest single maturity has been 365 days.
Fig�re 8: average mat�rity of rBa repos
Source:  RBA
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6.1.4	 Provision	of	funding	to	an	institution	experiencing	difficulties
Finally, while a central bank’s market operations are typically thought of as 
dealing with system-wide liquidity issues, they can also address liquidity strains 
being experienced by an individual institution. In particular, an institution having 
difficulty funding itself in the market is able to bid aggressively for funds in 
the central bank’s operations, providing it has appropriate assets to repo. It 
might do this if the private repo or outright markets in the relevant assets have 
been disrupted or, for some reason, market participants do not want to take any 
counterparty exposure to a troubled institution, even by way of a well-secured 
repo. For this to be a practical option, the central bank would have to conduct 
open market operations frequently, preferably daily, so that a troubled institution 
does not have to wait to access funding. 
There is, however, a limit to the extent to which market operations can be used 
in this way, as the size of daily operations is often relatively small compared 
to  the  funding  requirements,  particularly  of  a  large  bank.  Furthermore,  an 
institution that bid very aggressively for large volumes of funds over a number 
of days might expect to attract follow-up inquiries from the central bank and/or 
prudential supervisor, and to the extent that its activities become known, this has 
the potential to heighten market concern.
Fig�re 9: Long-term repos 
Share of total repos
Notes:  Long-term repos are 28 days or more; includes the TAF for the Federal Reserve
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6.2  direct transactions in markets
A second possible way in which the public sector can address liquidity issues is 
to purchase assets outright. This can be done by either the central bank or another 
public sector body.
This idea is sometimes seen as being quite controversial, although it has been 
applied to the foreign exchange market on numerous occasions. In particular, 
central banks (including the RBA) have been prepared to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to provide two-way liquidity, and have also intervened when the 
value of the domestic currency was judged to be inconsistent with its fundamental 
value.13 Similar intervention in other asset markets is rare, although in Hong Kong 
the authorities purchased equities during the late-1990s Asian financial crisis.
In principle, the same logic that has been used to justify direct purchases or 
sales of domestic currency for foreign currency could be used to justify direct 
purchases of other assets. If an asset market lacks two-way liquidity, or prices 
have moved far from fundamental value, a case could be made that the public 
sector should step in. Indeed, in Australia, two proposals have argued recently 
that an entity sponsored by the Australian Government should be prepared to 
acquire highly-rated home loans/RMBS if funding conditions in the mortgage 
market are severely disrupted.4 Similar arguments have been made by Buiter 
and Sibert (2007) in an international context.
This type of direct intervention can, however, expose taxpayers to considerable 
risk, distort the operation of markets in allocating resources, and potentially 
delay the recovery of the secondary market. Given this, there would seem to be 
a strong case to consider such intervention only if:
•  the lack of liquidity, or misalignment in prices, was likely to have first-order 
adverse effects on the macroeconomy;
•  the lack of liquidity, or misalignment in prices, was the result of some clear 
market failure, and was not likely to be rectified in a timely way; and
•  any intervention was not likely to materially distort the pricing of similar assets 
or affect the structure of the market in normal times.
If applied, these criteria would significantly restrict the types of assets for which 
intervention might be considered. They would almost certainly rule out purchases 
of assets with idiosyncratic features and where there were large information 
asymmetries. The most likely candidates are perhaps mortgage-backed securities 
and other high-quality bonds, although even here the likelihood of the above criteria 
13 For a discussion of the RBA’s intervention in the foreign exchange market see Becker and 
Sinclair (2004).
14 See Joye and Gans (2008) and Australian Securitisation Forum (2008).30
being satisfied would appear to be quite low. Notwithstanding this assessment, it 
is possible that situations arise where the outright purchase of financial assets is in 
the public interest. In extremis, the public sector, with its long-time horizon and 
large balance sheet, may be able to play a role in providing necessary liquidity to 
key asset markets, and to limit the consequences of severe market disturbances 
driving asset prices a long way from their fundamental value. 
6.3  Emergency Liq�idity assistance
A third possibility is to provide an explicit loan to a solvent, but troubled, 
institution; this is typically known as ‘emergency liquidity assistance’ or lender-
of-last-resort (LOLR) loan. While no such loans have been made in Australia 
for many decades, emergency liquidity assistance was recently provided by the 
Bank of England to Northern Rock, and by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York to Bear Stearns/JPMorgan Chase.15
This type of liquidity support can expose the public sector to considerably more 
risk than that incurred through market operations. Not only is the value of any 
collateral likely to be more uncertain (as the standard assets used for repos will 
have been exhausted), but the ‘double protection’ offered by repos in third-party 
assets does not apply. Moreover, liquidity problems will almost certainly reflect 
market concerns about the ongoing ability of the institution to repay its liabilities. 
While in some cases such concerns may be unfounded, in others they may have 
some basis in fact. Finally, as evidenced by Northern Rock, if the liquidity 
support is extensive, the need to repay the loan can be a major impediment to 
the institution remaining in the hands of the private sector.
Despite these considerable difficulties, such support might be justified in some 
circumstances. This is particularly the case if the troubles reflect the breakdown 
of markets and an extreme increase in risk aversion. If an institution clearly has 
significant positive net asset value, yet cannot fund its liabilities because of severe 
dislocation in markets, the central bank can play a stabilising role, preventing a 
fire sale of assets and perhaps a loss of confidence in the system as a whole.
Under some scenarios, there is likely to be a connection between the degree of 
flexibility in the central bank’s market operations and the probability that a troubled 
institution will need to seek emergency liquidity support. In particular, the more 
flexible are market operations – in terms of frequency, volumes, maturities and 
acceptable assets – the more likely it is that an institution with assets eligible for 
repos will be able to exchange those assets for liquidity in the course of normal 
market operations when the need arises. Indeed, an argument for flexibility in 
15 For a history of ‘emergency liquidity assistance’ in Australia see Fitz-Gibbon and Gizycki 
(2001). For a more recent discussion on the lender of last resort see Stevens (2008).31
regular market operations is that it can avoid the non-linear effects – partly due 
to adverse effects on public confidence – that can arise when an institution is 
known to have sought support.
Flexibility in market operations is, however, not without risks. In particular, if 
the liquidity problems reflect the poor health of the institution, which is seen by 
the other market participants, then it is possible that flexible market operations 
might allow the institution to delay the action required to correct its problems, 
thereby increasing losses if the institution does ultimately fail. This possibility 
means that in times of strain, close cooperation is required between the central 
bank and the prudential supervisor.
Finally, given the flexibility that many central banks now have in their market 
operations, it is highly likely that an institution requiring an emergency loan 
will have very serious balance sheet problems. Hence, an emergency loan is 
perhaps best thought of as a bridging loan while new ownership is arranged, or 
the institution is fundamentally restructured. LOLR might then be thought to 
stand for ‘lender of last rights’. In today’s world it seems unlikely (although not 
impossible) that an institution would be granted emergency assistance for a short 
period of time, repay that loan, and then continue as normal. To the extent that 
emergency assistance is really bridging finance, there is a strong case for it to 
be accompanied by a credible plan for private-sector support or recapitalisation 
(Bear Stearns), or some form of government support or recapitalisation (Northern 
Rock). In either case, the management and shareholders would be expected to 
incur very significant losses.
6.4  assisting off-market transfers
A fourth way in which liquidity issues could be addressed is through assisting 
with the off-market transfer of assets.
As noted in Section 3, the failure of a financial firm with extensive activities 
in financial markets raises concerns, not just because of the direct counterparty 
exposures, but also because of the potential cascading effects through financial 
markets. The fear is that many markets are simply not deep enough to deal with 
the rapid closing-out of positions and the flow-on effects from margin calls that 
would likely follow a failure. In the event that an institution with extensive 
operations in markets was forced into liquidation, the potential flow-on effects 
could undermine the stability of the financial system.
While these concerns are widely held and appear to be soundly based, it is 
important to note that this scenario has never played out in practice, with no major 
participant in financial markets having been forced into liquidation. This lack of 
experience makes it difficult to assess exactly what might happen in the event of 32
such a failure. Notwithstanding this, a reasonable question is how policy-makers 
should respond to this possibility (over and above providing general liquidity to 
the market and ensuring that the overall regulatory framework is sound). 
It can be argued that these distressed situations are best dealt with by a measured 
selling-down of positions, rather than an immediate sale in turbulent conditions 
where information asymmetries are likely to be acute. In some situations such 
an outcome might be able to be organised by the private sector, either by a single 
institution, or group of institutions, purchasing the positions off market, at a 
substantial discount. The public sector may be able to play a useful role here, 
particularly if coordination issues among the troubled institution’s counterparties 
prevent an effective solution that is in their collective interest.
A more difficult problem emerges if a private buyer cannot be found quickly. One 
option here would be for the public sector to purchase the assets/positions and 
then sell them over time when conditions are more settled; the Fed’s approach 
to Bear Stearns can be seen in this light. The argument for such an approach is 
that it might avoid a fire sale of financial assets that could prejudice the stability 
of the overall financial system. Furthermore, provided that the assets/positions 
are bought at a substantial discount to current value, the purchase may deliver a 
favourable risk-adjusted return to the public sector.
Such actions are, however, not without considerable risks. Not only is there the 
obvious risk that the assets may ultimately be worth less than the price that the 
public sector paid, but the possibility of such actions may change the behaviour 
of the private sector. In addition, when decisions have to be made very quickly, 
a type of game can develop between the public and private sectors, particularly 
if the private sector believes that the public sector will go to considerable lengths 
to protect the stability of the financial system. This game may lead to the public 
sector paying more for the assets than is desirable.
These are difficult issues to resolve, but as financial markets continue to grow, 
ways need to be found to allow large participants in these markets to exit without 
causing instability in the rest of the system. As discussed earlier, improving the 
financial infrastructure can be helpful here, but mechanisms also need to be found 
to prevent the fire sale of financial assets and limit the build-up of problems in 
the first place.
7.  Policy disc�ssion Policy disc�ssion
It is clear that liquidity problems can have significant effects on the financial 
system and the real economy. It is equally clear that there is no single solution 
to addressing these problems. Reducing information asymmetries and improving 
market infrastructure have an obvious role to play. An improvement in the way 33
that institutions manage their own liquidity is also required. Further, at the 
supervisory level, attention needs to be paid to the potential for system-wide 
liquidity problems, and not just problems that are restricted to a single institution. 
Central banks (and possibly other public sector bodies) also have an important 
role to play. At issue is how extensive this role should be, and what conditions 
should apply.
Unfortunately, too often discussions of this issue are derailed by quick references 
to the dangers of ‘moral hazard’. It is sometimes argued that if the public sector 
provides any form of liquidity services to the private sector, the result will be 
more risk-taking, and ultimately either a more crisis-prone system, or higher 
costs to the taxpayer.
While not wishing to downplay the risks, this argument misses a key point, namely 
that, while the provision of liquidity services by the public sector will undoubtedly 
change the behaviour of the private sector, this change in behaviour need not be 
welfare-reducing. If some form of systemic liquidity services are not provided, 
private institutions need to provide their own insurance by holding more liquid 
assets than would otherwise be the case. The end result may be a higher cost of 
financial intermediation and, in turn, a lower capital stock. Institutions may also 
be less prepared to commit funding for longer-term projects and more likely to 
cut back credit lines when troubled conditions emerge (although presumably the 
emergence of such conditions would be less likely). Indeed, making a credible 
ex ante commitment to provide a certain degree of liquidity assistance may 
actually reduce moral hazard relative to a statement that the central bank will 
not provide liquidity assistance. If the private sector does not believe that such 
a statement is credible, then it is likely to condition its behaviour on the level of 
liquidity assistance that it thinks the central bank would provide. 
None of this is to imply that institutions themselves should not have responsibility 
for managing their own liquidity. They clearly do. Moreover, they need to be 
prepared for significant dislocations in the key markets in which they operate 
and  disruptions  to  their  normal  funding  patterns.  Over  recent  years,  many 
institutions appear not to have done this adequately, undertaking too much maturity 
transformation, with too little capital, and on a funding base that was much less 
stable than widely assumed. It is important, though, that in responding to these 
shortcomings there is not an overreaction the other way which requires the private 
sector to fully self-insure against system-wide liquidity problems. Given that, to 
some extent, these problems arise from underlying distortions or market failures, 
full self-insurance is unlikely to be consistent with welfare maximisation.
In our view there is a strong case for the central bank to play the sort of liquidity 
smoothing role discussed in the previous section, increasing the supply of liquid 
assets at a time when the market places a very high value on these assets. It 34
can do this by increasing the size of its own balance sheet and/or changing the 
composition of its assets during times of strain. While playing such a smoothing 
role will lead to an increase in the risk carried on the central bank’s balance sheet, 
this increase can be limited by the use of appropriate haircuts, and the central 
bank will be compensated for this additional risk through higher expected returns 
on its asset holdings.
For this role to be played effectively, the central bank needs to have a considerable 
degree of flexibility in its market operations, including the frequency, maturity 
and scale of these operations. Many central banks have moved in this direction 
over the past year.
We also see a strong case for the central bank being prepared to purchase a wide 
range of third-party assets under repo. Doing so can reduce illiquidity premia that 
apply to these assets and reduce the possibility that solvent financial institutions 
find themselves needing to seek emergency support. One useful criterion to 
apply in considering where the boundary should be between acceptable and 
non-acceptable assets is the degree of information asymmetry, with the greater 
the asymmetry, the weaker the case for the central bank buying the asset under 
repo. In some situations, this criterion might rule out accepting assets that an 
institution has originated itself, or at least requiring greater protection through 
larger haircuts. 
In extremis, there may also be grounds for the public authorities to purchase 
outright a very limited range of assets. However, the risk-return trade-off from 
such purchases is, in most cases, likely to be much less attractive than the actions 
discussed above. This means that the ‘burden of proof’ that the public sector 
needs to meet in justifying such intervention should be set very high. One variant 
of this approach is for the public sector to assist with the off-market transfer of 
assets of a troubled financial firm, including possibly, in extremis, taking assets 
directly onto the public-sector balance sheet and disposing of those assets gradually 
over time. One argument for doing this is that in some extreme situations it is 
in the public interest for the assets owned by a troubled institution to be sold 
in a measured way, rather than dumped onto markets when risk and illiquidity 
premia are at their highest.
As discussed above, situations can also emerge where providing a loan directly to 
a troubled, but solvent, institution may also be in the public interest. Over time, 
however, with market operations becoming more flexible, the probability of such 
support being used to assist an institution over temporary funding difficulties has 
probably declined. It is more likely that such support provides bridging finance 
while new ownership and management are put in place. 35
In supporting a role for the public sector in providing a range of systemic liquidity 
services to the private sector, the moral hazard concerns discussed above need 
to be addressed. In doing so, it is important to recognise that the relative public 
versus private benefits of the various liquidity services differ across these services. 
In particular, there is a strong public good element in the central bank to play 
a contrarian role when liquid assets are in high demand, and in helping reduce 
illiquidity premiums in financial assets. While financial institutions benefit from 
these services, these benefits are spread widely and are not concentrated in a 
particular institution. In contrast, providing a direct loan to an institution can lead 
to significant benefits to those associated with that institution; of course there 
may be also benefits to the market more generally, particularly if, in the absence 
of the liquidity support, the troubled institution would be liquidated, causing 
widespread dislocation in financial markets. 
How then can the moral hazard concerns be addressed? We see three not mutually 
exclusive possibilities.
i.  The  first  is  a  strengthening  of  the  macro-prudential  elements  of 
supervision.
  While we have argued that there are strong grounds for the central bank to 
take a contrarian position in the sense we discuss above, and to assist more 
generally when system-wide liquidity problems emerge, there is a certain 
asymmetry if such actions occur only when conditions are unsettled. It is not 
implausible that this asymmetry itself could affect private-sector behaviour. 
One way of addressing this is for supervisory requirements to be tightened 
in the good times, when liquidity is judged to be ample and credit risk low. 
The case for this type of cyclical supervisory response is strengthened by the 
observation that system-wide liquidity problems invariably have their roots in 
the underestimation of risk in good times.6 If the public sector is to provide 
some form of systemic liquidity insurance – and inevitably accept a higher 
level of risk in doing so – the trade-off may be a tightening of supervisory 
requirements in good times. In a sense, such a tightening could be thought of 
as part of the ‘insurance premium’ that the private sector pays for the liquidity 
services that the public sector provides. It would also assist in the building-up 
of the system’s buffers in good times and reduce the probability of liquidity 
problems emerging when conditions eventually deteriorate.
ii.  A second possibility is to ensure that institutions are subject to prudential 
regulation if there is any possibility that the public sector might need to offer 
some form of institution-specific support. 
16 For  a  fuller  discussion  of  this  option  see  Borio  (2007)  and  Borio,  Furfine  and 
Lowe (2001).36
  Significant moral hazard issues arise if an institution is able to sit outside the 
regulatory net but obtain support when times are troubled. Again, submitting 
to prudential regulation can be part of the ‘insurance premium’ that institutions 
are required to pay if they are to ever obtain institution-specific assistance. 
There is a strong case for them to be required to pay this ‘premium’ if they 
are large and have complicated dealings in financial markets.
  A tangentially-related issue is who the central bank should be prepared 
to deal with in its daily market operations.7 Where these operations are 
conducted in high-quality, third-party assets, the counterparty risk being run 
by the central bank is normally low. There is, therefore, a strong case for the 
eligibility requirements to be largely limited to operational issues related to 
the effective implementation of monetary policy. If this is the case, then a 
very wide range of institutions – including non-banks – can participate in 
market operations (as is the case in Australia). The situation is somewhat 
different when it comes to transactions in assets that have been originated or 
sponsored by the central bank’s counterparty. Accepting related assets can 
involve significant additional risk, and the case for doing so in the course 
of normal market operations appears weak. This is particularly so for an 
institution that is not subject to prudential regulation. 
iii. A third way of addressing moral hazard relates directly to the conditions that 
apply to liquidity assistance outside normal market operations.
  As discussed earlier, if despite the central bank having flexible operating 
procedures, an institution requires emergency liquidity assistance, then that 
institution is probably in very significant trouble. Extending support to such 
an institution may be in the public interest, but it also risks providing benefits 
to those directly associated with the institution, including its managers and 
shareholders. Given this, it may be better to think of emergency liquidity 
support as the public sector providing bridging finance, while new ownership 
of the institution is being arranged. This was what essentially happened in 
the cases of Northern Rock and Bear Stearns, with in one case the new owner 
being the government, and the other, a private bank. It seems likely that the 
days are gone (if indeed they ever existed) in which an institution could obtain 
emergency support, then repay that support after the funding problems resolve 
themselves, with the bank institution then continuing on as normal.
17 See Hilton (2008) for a discussion of recent changes in the Fed’s range of eligible See  Hilton  (2008)  for  a  discussion  of  recent  changes  in  the  Fed’s  range  of  eligible 
counterparties.37
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